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Article 
Why the Policy Failures of Mass 
Incarceration Are Really Political 
Failures  
John F. Pfaff† 
INTRODUCTION 
In his new book, The Insidious Momentum of Mass Incarcer-
ation, Franklin Zimring tackles one of the biggest policy issues 
in the United States today: how can we effectively scale back our 
outsized reliance on incarceration? As his title suggests, Zimring 
is not particularly optimistic that we can, at least not in the short 
term. He argues that outcomes in a few states, such as Califor-
nia, suggest that large-scale shifts are possible if people want 
them, but that as a general matter the public is fairly content 
with high levels of incarceration, and that there are few if any 
ways to really change people’s “hearts and minds” on the issue.1 
That said, Zimring is not content to simply throw up his 
hands in despair, but commendably tries to see if there are policy 
fixes we can implement that can rein in mass incarceration, even 
if the political will for punishment remains high. Zimring 
chooses to focus on a serious policy failure that I have elsewhere 
called the “prosecutorial moral hazard” problem.2 Put simply, 
 
†  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Copyright © 2020 
by John F. Pfaff. 
 1. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE INSIDIOUS MOMENTUM OF MASS INCAR-
CERATION (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript ch. 5 at 17, ch. 8 at 18) (on file with 
author). He is skeptical even of how far California is willing to go. Id. (manu-
script ch. 5 at 23). While by 2017 California’s prison population had dropped by 
25% from its 2006 peak, that 2017 population (~130,000) was still over six times 
larger than its 1978 population (21,000). See E. Ann Carson & Joseph Mulako-
Wangota, Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT) – Prisoners, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps [https://perma.cc/4H5T 
-VM7N] (providing a dynamic tool showing changes over time in California’s 
prison population). 
 2. See JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN 54 (2017). 
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prosecutors are county officials who have the ability to draw on 
state resources—namely, the state-funded prison system—with-
out having to take into account any of the costs they impose on 
the state. Like any moral hazard problem, this leads to overuse. 
His decision to focus on this defect is surely tied to the fact that 
his home state of California has experienced the largest declines 
in prison populations since 2010, due in no small part to being 
the only state to directly confront this moral hazard problem. 
I am certainly sympathetic to the argument Zimring is put-
ting forth here; I’ve argued myself that we should work to close 
off this moral hazard problem. But I lack Zimring’s confidence 
that such reforms would be relatively easy for state legislatures 
to adopt (they weren’t in California); I’m concerned that even if 
adopted, local officials could easily subvert them (as California 
shows). And I think he understates both the plausibility and the 
efficacy of more-local reform efforts, particularly the rise of the 
so-called “progressive prosecutor.” The politics of punishment 
are changing, and in important ways that Zimring undersells.  
A common theme ties my critiques here together. Zimring 
views mass incarceration primarily as a policy failure, while I 
believe that it is important to frame it first and foremost as a 
political or ideological failure. It is hard to fix a policy failure 
when that failure is aligned with the prevailing ideology—as is 
the case with the prosecutorial moral hazard problem in partic-
ular and mass incarceration more broadly. And while perhaps 
not true in all areas of policy, at least when it comes to mass 
incarceration and mass punishment policy, fixes without ideo-
logical shifts will likely be easy to subvert and upend. 
I.  THE BACKSTORY: PROSECUTORIAL MORAL HAZARD 
AND CALIFORNIA’S SOLUTION 
Although we often talk about our “criminal justice system,” 
it is a misleading phrase. It suggests, by using “system” in the 
singular, that what we have is a unified institution working to 
achieve some coherent set of goals. This is manifested, for exam-
ple, when reformers say things along the lines that “the system 
isn’t broken, it’s doing what it was designed to do.” 
What we have, however, is not a system but a set of sys-
tems—plural—that span city, county, state, and federal govern-
ments, and which have been haphazardly—and often ineptly—
strung together into some sort of legal Rube Goldberg machine 
we call the “Criminal Justice System.” And one major cog in this 
sprawling, ill-designed set of systems is the prosecutor. There 
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are approximately 2,200 prosecutor offices nationwide, almost 
all of which operate at the county level, and almost all of which 
rely on that county’s electorate to vote for its chief district attor-
ney.3 While the specifics of funding for prosecutors vary from 
state to state, by and large the county that elects them pays for 
them as well; in 2005, counties contributed over 80% of district 
attorney budgets, with nearly one-third of all offices funded en-
tirely by the county.4 
Prosecutors have nearly unfettered discretion about 
whether to charge people with crimes at all, and what crime to 
charge them with if pushing forward with a case. And given how 
expansive—and expansively written—our criminal codes are, 
prosecutors often have a remarkably wide range of choices to 
pick from when charging a defendant, including whether to 
charge a lower-level misdemeanor or a higher-level felony.5 Mis-
demeanors are usually punishable by no more than one year be-
hind bars, with the time served in a county jail, while felonies 
are generally defined as at least one year, to be served in state 
prison. 
This is where the moral hazard problem arises. Being 
harsher by charging the felony isn’t just better politics—even in 
our reformist period, being tough on crime remains relatively po-
litically safe—but is fiscally cheaper. Jail terms increase the 
costs borne by the county, and it is county officials who set the 
prosecutor’s budget. Prison sentences, on the other hand, are 
 
 3. See Prosecutors Offices, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=27 [https://perma.cc/68CH-82XY]. There are fewer prose-
cutor offices than counties (of which there are 3,142) because in some states 
prosecutors represent multi-county judicial districts. District attorneys are 
elected by their districts in 46 states. District attorneys are appointed in three 
states (Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey), and in Delaware the state-elected 
attorney general is also officially the district attorney for the state as a whole.  
 4. See STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 (July 2006), https://www.bjs 
.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L9N-K2HM]. Unfortunately, 
2005 is the last year for which there is clear data from the BJS, an all-too-com-
mon problem with criminal justice data. See John Pfaff, How Zombie Crime 
Stats, Phantom Stats and Frankenstats Paint a Misleading Picture on Crime, 
APPEAL (Mar. 1, 2018), https://theappeal.org/how-zombie-crime-stats-phantom 
-stats-and-frankenstats-paint-a-misleading-picture-on-crime-fddb2c2070cd/ 
[https://perma.cc/4H5T-VM7N]. 
 5. A given act may violate the statutes for attempted manslaughter, ag-
gravated assault, and reckless endangerment. The first could be a serious fel-
ony, the last merely a misdemeanor. A prosecutor is free to charge all three or 
to pick just one (or none), subject to no review outside of periodic elections. 
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paid for by the state-level department of corrections, and thus 
have no impact on local budgets. Harsher, for the prosecutor, is 
cheaper. 
This moral hazard problem helps explains some of the more 
persistent and problematic defects we see in our criminal justice 
system(s). It is clear from the data, for example, that policing 
deters crime far more than tougher sentences: people respond 
much more to the certainty of punishment than its severity.6 Yet 
our common response to shockingly-low “clearance” rates (the 
fraction of reported crimes that result in an arrest) is to push for 
tougher sanctions, not more policing or enforcement.7 This er-
rant focus makes more sense in light of the moral hazard prob-
lem, which applies to local policing as well. Cities already spend 
something on the order of one-fourth to one-third of their budg-
ets on policing—hiring more police is fiscally challenging, but 
calling for tougher prison sentences is a “free” way to still appear 
tough on crime.8  
Zimring’s proposal, then, is to figure out how to make local 
government actors—here, county prosecutors—pay attention to 
the costs they impose on the state. This was how California re-
sponded to recent demands that it cut its prison populations. 
Since 1991, California had been embroiled in federal litigation 
over conditions in its overcrowded prisons, and in 2009 the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that California cut its prison 
population to reduce its capacity usage from nearly 200% to 
137.5%.9 California responded in 2011 by adopting Assembly Bill 
109, the “2011 Realignment Legislation Addressing Public 
 
 6. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrent Effects of the Certainty and Severity 
of Punishment, in DETERRENCE, CHOICE, AND CRIME 157 (Taylor & Francis eds., 
2018). 
 7. Senator Tom Cotton (R-Ariz.) made this point explicitly when he op-
posed the federal First Step Act. He pointed out, correctly, that our clearance 
rates are very low, and then used that point to argue—less convincingly—that 
that meant our incarceration rate was too low, not too high. See Nick Gass, Sen. 
Tom Cotton: U.S. Has ‘Under-Incarceration Problem,’ POLITICO (May 19, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/tom-cotton-under-incarceration-223371 
[https://perma.cc/3Z2N-BKEU]. 
 8. See Niall McCarthy, How Much Do U.S. Cities Spend Every Year on 
Policing, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/ 
2017/08/07/how-much-do-u-s-cities-spend-every-year-on-policing-infographic/ 
#46a1740de7b7 [https://perma.cc/ZD6B-MB49]. 
 9. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 15, 2008). 
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Safety,” which generally goes by the name “Realignment.” Rea-
lignment is a sprawling, complicated law, but two aspects of it 
are central to the discussion here. First, it greatly restricted the 
ability of local governments to send those on parole or serving 
probation sentences back to state prison. And second, it in-
structed that people classified as “triple-nons”—people convicted 
of non-violent, non-serious, non-sex felony offenses—could not be 
sent to state facilities, but had to serve their time at the county 
level.10 
The immediate impact of Realignment was significant. Dur-
ing its first year, the state prison population fell by about 30,000 
people.11 After that, however, the prison population held steady 
until three years later, when an unrelated reform proposition led 
to another sharp drop. Nonetheless, that 30,000 decline was sub-
stantial: between 2010 and 2015, the decline in just the state of 
California was responsible for about half the net decline in 
prison populations nationwide.12 Counties suddenly had to pay 
for prisoners, and suddenly . . . fewer people went to prison. 
This seemingly optimistic outcome is what motivates Zim-
ring’s central policy recommendation here. But as I will show in 
the sections ahead, there are real reasons to be wary of how 
likely states are to adopt Realignment, and how successful it 
would be if adopted, absent broader ideological shifts. We cannot 
escape the issue of hearts and minds. 
II.  THE TRICKY FINANCES AND POLITICS OF 
REALIGNMENT 
My first concern with Zimring’s proposal is that he is too op-
timistic about the chances that other states will adopt Realign-
ment-like policies. He never provides any real discussion about 
the politics of adopting such a law, instead just asserting that it 
could be done as a “simple two-step”: first change the fiscal in-
 
 10. For specifics on exactly which crimes fall within the triple-non category, 
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h) (West 2020). 
 11. See Magnus Lofstrom & Steven Raphael, Prison Downsizing and Public 
Safety: Evidence from California, 15 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 352 (2016). 
 12. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, PRISONERS IN 2016 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PF6S-WNTE]; PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONS IN 2010 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4NH-P77D]. 
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centives prosecutors face, and then the local prosecutors’ behav-
ior will change accordingly.13 As we will quickly see, neither part 
of this two-step is simple at all. In this section, I want to point 
out why we should expect significant resistance from legislators 
who have tolerated—if not benefited from—the moral hazard 
problem for decades. 
In fact, California itself is a clear cautionary tale. It did not 
eagerly seek out Realignment, but had to be brought to it kicking 
and screaming. California struggled against oversight for nearly 
twenty years before the Ninth Circuit order compelled them to 
cut prison capacity to 137.5%, and then the state fought the or-
der up to the Supreme Court, adopting Realignment in 2011 only 
after its narrow 5–4 loss before the Court in Brown v Plata.14  
That it fought the Ninth Circuit order so aggressively is tell-
ing, because by the time that court imposed the order, California 
was openly admitting that the conditions in its prisons were 
simply inhumane. During the course of the litigation over the 
order, the state acknowledged that overcrowding so overtaxed 
the prisons’ health care facilities that one person in prison died 
from an otherwise-preventable death every six or so days: an an-
nual preventable death toll of sixty people, at a time when the 
nation as a whole was executing only about forty people per 
year.15 In fact, that inexcusable death count surely played a ma-
jor part in California’s defeat in Plata. It is remarkably hard 
these days for people in prison to sue in federal court, thanks to 
restrictions put in place by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA). The dissenters in Plata, in fact, felt that the PLRA 
should have blocked the prisoners’ claims, despite the lethality 
of California’s prisons, but the majority argued that California’s 
prisons were simply too deadly.16 
All of which is to say: California grudgingly adopted Rea-
lignment under intense political pressure, pressure that other 
states are far less likely to experience. If nothing else, it seems 
unlikely that federal courts will be able to force other states to 
follow in California’s footsteps. As of 2017, only two states’ ca-
pacity-use rates came close to the 137.5% line barely upheld in 
 
 13. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 8 at 19). 
 14. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
 15. See id. at 505 n.3; TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2017: SELECTED FINDINGS (2019), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp17sf.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D2Z-9WVM]. 
 16. Plata, 563 U.S. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 565 (Alito, J., dis-
senting).  
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Plata, and at most one was close to the 200% rate that triggered 
the 137.5%-ruling in the first place.17 Given the barriers put in 
place by the PLRA, if states are going to adopt Realignment-like 
policies, the political pressure is going to have to come from 
within, not without. 
And there are several reasons to think that state legisla-
tures will not feel that necessary pressure to change, and in fact 
may actively oppose any such efforts. To start, there is little fis-
cal incentive to act, as recent state behavior (perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly) indicates. Despite the enormous fiscal impact of 
the 2008 credit crisis, and despite the austerity-laced rhetoric 
that has infused debates about criminal justice reform since 
then, states actually spent more on prisons in 2015 and 2016, at 
least in nominal terms, than ever before; spending did decline a 
bit from 2010–2013, but it has been rising since.18 Real spending 
on prisons is down a bit, but it too has been rising in recent years, 
and it was higher in 2016 than it was in 2005.19 As a share of 
total state expenditures, correctional spending has declined 
somewhat, but only a bit: from 3.6% of all direct spending in 2005 
to 2.9% of all direct spending in 2016.20 All told, it is a story of 
relative stability. 
That the austerity talking points have shown up in rhetoric 
far more than in practice is not so surprising, once we realize 
how relatively little states spend on corrections. At only about 
 
 17. To be clear, Plata did not argue that there was any Eighth Amendment 
significance to a capacity-use rate of 137.5%. It simply upheld the Ninth Circuit 
panel’s imposition of such a line. See id. at 544–45. The two states with the 
highest capacity-use rates in 2017 were Alabama (at 167%) and Delaware (at 
150%), although the Bureau of Justice Statistics measures capacity in two dif-
ferent ways, and only Delaware had a use rate above 100% (at 110%) using the 
more generous definition. See JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017 (2019), https:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KA-ZRDL]. 
 18. All fifty states spent about $49 billion on prisons in 2016, a 6.5% in-
crease from its nadir of $46 billion in 2010. In nominal terms, spending in 2016 
is 20% higher than it was in 2005, when it was about $38 billion, and about 2% 
higher than its peak in 2009 at $47.8 billion. Data are from the Census Bureau’s 
Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances, available on-line at 
Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/data/datasets.2016 
.html [https://perma.cc/3L3U-YH5M]. 
 19. In 2005 dollars, spending in 2016 was down around 8% from its 2009 
peak, but it had risen by about 3.5% since hitting its low in 2013. Compared to 
2005, real prison spending in 2016 was up by over 3%. See id. 
 20. Id. 
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3% of state spending, even deep cuts to corrections will not 
change the fiscal bottom line all that much. So as long as there 
are other reasons to keep that spending high—and there are—it 
seems unlikely that there will be much countervailing pressure 
to rein it in. 
And when we look at why spending on corrections has been 
rising, even after the credit crunch, we immediately see a major 
political barrier to Realignment. A major factor pushing up 
spending has been wages. Even though prison staffing has fallen 
along with declines in prison populations, to such an extent that 
the officer-prisoner ratio has stayed almost constant since 2010, 
total real spending on employment has risen significantly, by 
about 16%.21 This payroll spending in turn creates a strong base 
of resistance when it comes to Realignment. 
While prison jobs are often quite unpleasant, with shock-
ingly high rates of PTSD and suicidal ideation,22 they are also 
often among the few well-paying jobs in the relatively remote 
places where states have often built most of their prisons.23 Leg-
islators with prisons in their districts are unlikely to want to 
jeopardize what could be one of the few well-paying jobs in the 
area. The desire to protect those jobs surely rises with the size of 
the payroll, especially in times when outside employment likely 
remains weak in many of these communities. 
Moreover, in most states, legislators in rural districts with-
out prisons also have a strong incentive to resist policies that will 
cut prison populations to any significant degree. In forty-two 
states, people confined to prisons count as “living” in those pris-
ons for the purposes of drawing legislative districts, even though 
they are not allowed to vote.24 Given that people in prison are 
disproportionately people of color from urban areas, and that 
 
 21. John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2018, 3:12 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/1031997397960941569 [https://perma.cc/2LJG 
-MDFX]. 
 22. John F. Pfaff, Locked Up, BAFFLER (July 2019), https://thebaffler.com/ 
salvos/locked-up-pfaff [https://perma.cc/DS7H-32FD]. 
 23. See, e.g., JOHN M. EASON, BIG HOUSE ON THE PRAIRIE: RISE OF THE RU-
RAL GHETTO AND PRISON PROLIFERATION (2017). 
 24. In two states, Maine and Vermont, people in prison are counted as liv-
ing in the prison but are allowed to vote. In six states—Delaware, California, 
Maryland, New York, Nevada, and Washington—people in prison are counted 
(or will count at the next Census) as living in their last known address (and 
cannot vote while incarcerated). That means in the remaining forty-two states, 
people in prison “live” in their prisons but cannot vote. John F. Pfaff, Criminal 
Punishment and the Politics of Place, 45 FORDHAM U. L.J. 571, 588–89 (2018).  
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prisons tend to be disproportionately located in more rural 
places, this counting practice, widely known as the “prison ger-
rymander,” effectively transfers Democratic-leaning voters to 
Republican-leaning districts while denying them the franchise.25 
It is, in many ways, a five-fifths compromise. 
In other words, all Republican legislators have a strong in-
centive to resist a policy like Realignment, which by requiring 
people to serve prison terms in local jails would shift people away 
from more Republican districts and put them in more Demo-
cratic ones, thus undermining the Republican Party’s overall 
state strength. One study of Pennsylvania, for example, found 
that undoing the gerrymander there would likely mean that four 
rural districts would suddenly have too few people to satisfy 
equal-representation laws, and the new maps would likely cre-
ate at least one or two new majority-minority districts in Phila-
delphia, which would likely flip those seats (and possibly a few 
others) from Republican to Democratic.26 (Tellingly, the only 
states to reverse the prison gerrymander have done so when the 
Democrats have controlled both chambers of the legislature and 
the governor’s mansion.)27 
So why would any Republican politician undermine the ger-
rymander—especially when the prisons are providing not just 
votes but jobs, and the overall fiscal costs are pretty slight? 
None of this means that Realignment is impossible, or that 
it is not a fight worth having. But as this section shows, Zim-
ring’s efforts to separate out the “easy” policy fixes from the 
“hard” political work of changing hearts and minds elides the 
fact that the policy defects exist because of their partisan politi-
 
 25. Id. at 589. 
 26. Jonathan Lai, How ‘Prison Gerrymandering’ Shifts Political Power from 
Urban Pennsylvanians of Color to White, Rural Ones, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 11, 
2019), https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/prison-gerrymandering 
-pa-2021-redistricting-census-20190725.html [https://perma.cc/7Q98-964C]; 
Brianna Remster & Rory Kramer, SHIFTING POWER: The Impact of Incarcer-
ation on Political Representation, CAMBRIDGE CORE (Apr. 16, 2019), https:// 
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/du-bois-review-social-science-research-on 
-race/article/shifting-power/3C54A4F45E8E7129B1AEFCB0B7B15432 [https:// 
perma.cc/VF8R-GWFK]. As of 2019, the Republicans have a 110–98 majority in 
the House; just switching two seats shifts that to 108–100, and switching four 
would nearly flip control, at 106–102. 
 27. John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Oct. 31, 2019, 11:36 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/1189944193411616768 [https://perma.cc/B47V 
-TS2R]. 
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cal appeal. Tellingly, no state has followed in California’s foot-
steps in any real sense, despite the fact that the state adopted 
Realignment nearly a decade ago. Given all the fiscal-austerity 
rhetoric in criminal justice today, that silence is telling. 
III.  THE LIKELY LOCAL SUBVERSION OF 
REALIGNMENT 
If “reducing mass incarceration” is to mean anything, it 
must mean reducing the number of people in all types of cages, 
not just the specific sort that we call “prisons.” So for Realign-
ment to succeed, by almost any sense of that term, it must be 
that it leads to fewer people in both prisons and jails, not just 
prisons.28 So it is worth asking how local officials will in fact re-
act to cost internalization: will they incarcerate fewer people, or 
will they spend more money (and perhaps cut other services) to 
ensure that lots of people still spend time behind bars? The evi-
dence, such as it is, is mixed. 
California’s own experience with Realignment provides, 
once again, an important cautionary tale. Over the first year of 
Realignment, state prison populations fell by slightly less than 
30,000, at which point things leveled out until the state adopted 
Proposition 47 a few years later, which was an unrelated reform 
that led to a second decline in prison populations. Yet over that 
same three-year period between the implementation of Realign-
ment and the passage of Prop 47, average daily jail populations 
in the state grew by 10,000—thus offsetting nearly one-third of 
Realignment’s impact on prison populations.29 
These partially-offsetting trends suggest that while local 
governments may not wish to offset state declines at a one-to-
one ratio, they are certainly willing to expend additional re-
sources to preserve some of decarceration brought about by Rea-
 
 28. It is, of course, possible to support Realignment without seeking out 
decarceration. It is perfectly consistent to argue that incarceration is an ac-
ceptable policy, but counties should have to pay for it themselves. It is also pos-
sible to argue that my definition of “cages” is too small. Everything from elec-
tronic monitoring to denying certain people employment opportunities can be 
seen as ways that the criminal justice system “cages” people. Here, however, I 
will just focus on prisons and jails. 
 29. MAGNUS LOFSTROM & BRANDON MARTIN, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., 
PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT: IMPACTS SO FAR (2015), https://www.ppic.org/ 
publication/public-safety-realignment-impacts-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/H54B 
-L5RU]. 
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lignment-like reforms, and that the total prison-plus-jail popu-
lation in a state that follows in California’s lead will decline by 
less than the simple take on California’s prisons suggests.30 
One risk with Realignment-like policies, then, is that local 
governments may cut other services to fund the increase in local 
incarceration costs. Here, too, experiences in California illumi-
nate the risk. Capital cases do not implicate the prosecutorial 
moral hazard to nearly the same degree as any other type of 
crime, because a much bigger chunk of the cost of a capital case 
is the prosecution itself. And in some cases, counties in Califor-
nia appear to have made steep cuts to everything else to main-
tain their ability to bring these sorts of capital charges: 
In Sierra County, California authorities had to cut police services in 
1988 to pick up the tab of pursuing death penalty prosecutions. The 
County’s District Attorney, James Reichle, complained, “If we didn’t 
have to pay $500,000 a pop for Sacramento’s murders, I’d have an in-
vestigator and the sheriff would have a couple of extra deputies and we 
could do some lasting good for Sierra County law enforcement. The 
sewage system at the courthouse is failing, a bridge collapsed, there’s 
no county library, no county park, and we have volunteer fire and vol-
unteer search and rescue.” The county’s auditor, Don Hemphill, said 
that if death penalty expenses kept piling up, the county would soon be 
broke. Just recently, Mr. Hemphill indicated that another death pen-
alty case would likely require the county to lay off 10 percent of its 
police and sheriff force.31 
This is a clear reminder that it is impossible to divorce policy 
from politics: if the ideology remains unchanged, people will 
work around whatever changes they face. The framing here is 
particularly worth paying attention to. The district attorney does 
not say that he is choosing to file the capital charges that are 
pushing his county towards bankruptcy, but rather that these 
legal costs are just somehow inevitable and unavoidable; and, 
importantly, not in need of any real justification.  
Tellingly, there is already evidence that local governments 
are spending a significant amount on local jail construction in 
California. Partly this reflects the persistence of an ideological 
 
 30. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 2). Zimring acknowledges this 
offset, but describes it using an index graph that makes it hard to see the mag-
nitude by which jail populations appear to have replaced prison ones. 
 31. Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don’t Say About 
the High Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 1, 1994), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpic-reports/in-depth/millions 
-misspent-what-politicians-dont-say-about-the-high-costs-of-the-death 
-penalty#the-financial-costs-of-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/V5Y5 
-BDVC]. 
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commitment to prisons and jails, but it comes with an important 
twist that points to another way local officials will work to un-
dermine Realignment. It turns out that the counties were able 
to quickly cut back on at least some of Realignment’s financial 
bite. In the wake of adopting Realignment, the state government 
provided the counties with millions of dollars in aid to help build 
out jails, starting from $400 million in the first nine months, and 
rising to over $1 billion by 2013.32 During this time, in 2012, the 
voters in California adopted Proposition 30, which among other 
things wrote some of these subsidies into the state constitution; 
as of 2018, these permanent subsidies come to about $1.3 bil-
lion.33 To put that in perspective, the entire annual budget for 
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is 
about $12 billion.34 
So, on the one hand, perhaps the prison-to-jail shift seen in 
California would be less prevalent in a state that imposed Rea-
lignment but eschewed the subsidies. On the other hand, per-
haps the lesson from California is that local governments will be 
effective at lobbying the state to help bail them out. 
It is important, however, to not oversell this last concern. 
California had to be forced by the Ninth Circuit to impose signif-
icant cuts in its prison populations; given the lack of volition on 
California’s part, perhaps it is not surprising that Sacramento 
was willing to help local governments continue to lock people up. 
A state that adopted Realignment-like policies more voluntarily 
may be less willing to continue to preserve mass incarceration at 
the local level. 
Still, any sort of Realignment policy has to confront the clear 
willingness on the part of all levels of government—city, county, 
and state—to commit significant resources to locking people up, 
 
 32. MIA BIRD & JOSEPH HAYNES, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., FUNDING PUB-
LIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT tbl.1 (2013), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/ 
report/R_1113MBR.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8SH-E27W]. 
 33. For some background on Prop 30, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2011 PUBLIC 
SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND PROPOSITION 30, at 2 (2011) https://www.cdss.ca 
.gov/cdssweb/entres/pdf/2011RealignmentProp30.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3D3 
-P3PQ]. For current allocations, see, for example, RURAL CTY. REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF CAL., GOVERNOR’S 2018-19 PROPOSED BUDGET: THE RURAL RUNDOWN 
(2018), https://www.rcrcnet.org/sites/default/files/useruploads/Documents/ 
Resources/Misc/RCRCAnalysis_2018_19_ProposedBudget.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/H49T-DYCP]. 
 34. Budget Information: CDCR’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2018-2019, CAL. 
DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/budget/ (last visited Mar. 22, 
2020). 
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and to criminal justice more broadly. Cities, for example, already 
dedicate a significant portion of their budgets to policing, often 
on the order of one-quarter to one-third.35 Counties are likely 
willing to dedicate significant spending to criminal justice as 
well—perhaps even more so, given that county governments 
tend to be more conservative than city ones. All of which sug-
gests that they may often be willing to cut other spending to 
maintain their jail populations, at least on the margin. 
IV.  ONE POLICY TRAP: THE COMPLICATED ECONOMICS 
OF VIOLENCE 
Zimring also overstates the ease of designing an internali-
zation policy, even if the politics of doing so were straightfor-
ward. Here, once again, California itself provides a useful warn-
ing. California’s Realignment did not require that local jails 
house all people convicted of state felonies, just the non-violent, 
non-sexual, non-serious “triple-nons.” It’s a limitation that could 
make sense, but needs to be unpacked a little bit. 
On the one hand, it appears to defeat much of the goal of 
Realignment. In California, about half of all people admitted to 
prison are admitted for violence, and over 70% are admitted for 
homicide, physical or sexual assault, robbery, burglary, or fire-
arms.36 If you look at those serving long sentences (those in the 
top 10% of time served), over 95% nationwide are in for serious 
violence, and in California something close to half are in just for 
homicide.37 Nationwide, our incarceration rate just for those con-
victed of homicide and sex offenses is roughly the same as the 
all-crimes incarceration rates almost anywhere else in the 
world.38 There will be no fundamental, radical change in incar-
ceration rates, in California or the U.S. more broadly, unless we 
 
 35. See McCarthy, supra note 8. Of course, given the complicated nature of 
intergovernmental transfers and obligations, those high percentages may re-
flect in part that the city simply isn’t responsible for major expenditures. New 
York City’s share to policing is lower than most places, for example, in part 
because it has control over more aspects of its spending than many places do. 
 36. California’s Prison Population, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., https://www 
.ppic.org/publication/californias-prison-population/ [https://perma.cc/J2Q3 
-PD57]. 
 37. Demographics: The Unequal Burden of Long Prison Terms, URBAN, 
https://apps.urban.org/features/long-prison-terms/demographics.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Y767-A3FB]; John Pfaff, (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (July 20, 2017, 
10:01 AM) https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/888051281381687296?s=20 
[https://perma.cc/Z2HU-CJK3]. 
 38. Pfaff, supra note 22. 
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cut the number of people admitted for violence and the amount 
of time they spend behind bars. And these are the very crimes 
that Realignment excludes from internalization. 
Yet there is a certain logic to Realignment’s exclusions. 
Communities that suffer from elevated levels of violence often 
suffer from a wide range of other adverse social outcomes as well, 
such as poverty and poor public health.39 In fact, the relationship 
between these can be highly endogenous: poverty can lead to vi-
olence and crime, but violence itself contributes to the poverty 
by, say, reducing employment and educational opportunities. 
Perhaps we don’t want to force poorer counties with higher rates 
of violence and other social challenges to have to shoulder even 
more of the cost of reducing crime. Perhaps we want wealthy 
suburbs and cities to subsidize poorer areas that struggle with a 
host of challenges. 
In other words, the problem is more complex than just 
“there’s a moral hazard,” because, to some extent, the moral haz-
ard could be a form of desirable cross-subsidization. Perhaps the 
issue is more about how the counties have exploited the moral 
hazard, or about the sort of moral hazard problem we have cre-
ated. If poorer counties had free access to state-funded hospitals 
and “over-used” them, thereby reducing higher infant mortality 
rates, I doubt we’d see people pushing to shut off access. And so 
perhaps the goal should be less about bluntly focusing on how to 
make counties internalize costs, and more about figuring out 
how to make sure that what we are subsidizing is something 
more effective and humane than prisons. And to be fair, Realign-
ment did try to do some of this, by encouraging (but not requir-
ing) counties to build out treatment rather than cells. But the 
shift in how money is spent rather than who is spending it is 
something that deserves far more attention than it’s gotten. 
V.  THE POTENTIAL OF PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS 
Finally, I want to address head-on Zimring’s skepticism 
about progressive prosecution. Zimring’s concern is really one 
about bottom-up solutions more broadly: we need the state to fix 
things from the top, he argues, because we cannot expect the lo-
cal governments to fix things from the bottom. As he clearly 
states: “bottom up strategies of attitude change are probably 
 
 39. See, e.g., Graham C. Ousey, Crime Is Not the Only Problem: Examining 
Why Violence & Adverse Health Outcomes Co-Vary Across Large U.S. Counties, 
50 J. CRIM. JUST. 29, 30 (2017). 
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both unnecessary and inefficient. It is much easier to alter power 
relations and incentives in criminal case dispositions than to 
change hearts and minds . . . .”40 Of course, as I have been argu-
ing so far, that argument glosses over the question of why state 
officials with unchanged hearts and minds would change things 
in the first place, or why recalcitrant local officials would not un-
dermine those changes as soon as they were adopted. 
Here, however, I want to tackle this claim from the opposite 
direction: not to argue that changing hearts and minds is neces-
sary, but that it is also feasible, and in fact is already underway, 
and perhaps working more efficiently than we could expect from 
top-down reforms. I think there are two key missteps to how 
Zimring characterizes progressive prosecution that leads him to 
significantly understate its efficacy. First, and less important, he 
mischaracterizes what prosecutors in fact are doing. Second, and 
more important, his political model of criminal justice reform 
overly homogenizes the electorate in ways that lead his analysis 
astray. 
To begin, his description of prosecutors and how they see 
their jobs is somewhat peculiar. He views them as bloodthirsty 
and uncontrollable, in literally animalistic terms. He starts by 
saying that: “In adversarial systems of criminal justice, the pub-
lic prosecutor is supposed to emphasize the guilt of those they 
rightfully accuse of crime and the importance of severe punish-
ment in the achievement of retributive and utilitarian objec-
tives.”41 
There is certainly some truth to this claim. But Zimring then 
goes further, to completely absolve prosecutors of any responsi-
bility for making such choices. “Other officials and other legal 
institutions,” he continues, “are supposed to counteract the hard-
line sentiments of prosecutors to bring balance to the sys-
tem . . . . Why blame only prosecutors for acting just as we expect 
prosecutors to act . . . ?”42 
To drive the point home, he then equates prosecutors to 
predatory coyotes who kill unfenced sheep, and he argues that 
to blame prosecutors for mass incarceration is like blaming the 
coyotes, not the ranchers who didn’t build fences. “The coy-
otes . . . were behaving just like coyotes always behave when 
 
 40. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 8 at 18). 
 41. Id. at 21. 
 42. Id. at 18. 
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sheep are freely available, and this could not have come as a sur-
prise to the sheep ranchers. Fences were expensive but availa-
ble.” He concludes this analogy by asking, “Who was most at 
fault?”43 
That’s easy. The prosecutors. Just because I leave my house 
unlocked does not in any way absolve the burglar for choosing to 
break in. And prosecutors are people who make choices, not wild 
animals driven purely by instinct and the scent of blood. 
But let’s leave aside the remarkable moralistic problems 
with this argument.44 Even as an empirical claim, Zimring’s take 
is deeply problematic. Rather than bloodthirsty coyotes, William 
Stuntz describes prosecutors in far more nuanced terms: 
Prosecutors are not like civil plaintiffs: they are not paid by the convic-
tion, with bonuses for each additional month the defendant spends in 
prison. [Thus] extra months in prison are not like marginal dollars in 
civil cases. Once the defendant’s sentence has reached the level the 
prosecutor prefers . . . adding more time offers no benefit to the prose-
cutor. Indeed, prosecutors may actually value “extra” prison time neg-
atively. . . . A civil plaintiff has the incentive to take every dollar he 
can, just as the defendant wishes to pay as little as possible. In criminal 
cases, one of the two parties is like that: the defendant almost always 
prefers freedom to incarceration and less incarceration to more. The 
prosecutor’s utility function, though, is much more complicated.45 
Stuntzian prosecutors, unlike Zimringian ones, have much 
greater potential for reform. And I believe that Stuntz’s model of 
prosecutors is the more accurate one. 
Now, to be fair, there surely are some prosecutors out there 
who are more Zimringian than Stuntzian, but it is important to 
think about where those prosecutors might be, and what that ge-
ography means for the possibility of bottom-up reforms. This 
brings us to the second problem with Zimring’s take on progres-
sive prosecution. 
There are two recent trends in the geography of mass incar-
ceration that deserve attention, one that Zimring notes but the 
other that he does not. The first, which he does point out, is that 
the “national” decline in prison populations is actually just a de-
cline in about half the states. Only twenty-six states were hold-
ing fewer people in prison in 2016 than in 2009, and over 35% of 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Although please do not take my silence as acceptance. Zimring is excus-
ing prosecutors from taking responsibility, an excuse prosecutors would never 
offer a defendant charged with a far less serious crime than “causing mass in-
carceration.” 
 45. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing 
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2554 (2004). 
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the decline in those twenty-six states was just California; nearly 
60% of the nation’s decline occurred in just the five biggest-de-
clining states (California, New York, Texas, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut).46 
The second trend, however, which Zimring does not exam-
ine, is the more important. Outside of just a few states (one of 
which is, admittedly, California), even these state declines were 
not really state declines, but rather were urban-county declines. 
Mass incarceration has not been immune to the urban-rural 
fragmentation that runs through so many different aspects of life 
and policy these days. As a general matter, higher-population 
counties are now sending fewer people to prison while smaller 
counties are sending more, and what looks like a state decline 
(or increase) is usually a case in which the more urban counties 
declined by more (or less) than the more rural ones rose.47 
In other words, much of the decline, at least outside of Cali-
fornia, has in fact been the product of non-state, local-govern-
ment, bottom-up change in high-population counties. A clear ex-
ample of this is New York State, which, unlike California under 
Realignment, did not experience a sharp one-year decline fol-
lowed by stasis, if not growth, but rather witnessed the longest 
and largest sustained prison decline in modern U.S. history. Be-
tween 2000 and 2016, New York prisons shrunk by over 22,000 
people, a decline of over 30%. California’s decline from 2010–
2012 was numerically bigger, at just over 30,000, but in percent-
age terms it was barely half the New York decline, at 18%.48 
Yet New York’s was not a state decline. In fact, by 2011, most 
counties in the state were sending more people to prison than 
they had in 2000—only twelve of the state’s sixty-two counties 
saw declines, and in half those counties the decline was fewer 
than 200 people. But four of those counties were the four biggest 
counties of New York City, which collectively cut the number of 
residents in prison by over 19,000.49 In other words, New York 
 
 46. Carson & Mulako-Wangota, supra note 1. 
 47. Josh Keller & Adam Pearce, A Small Indiana County Sends More Peo-
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State did not experience a push towards decarceration over the 
2000s; New York City did, and did so without any meaningful 
policy changes.50 It was the decisions by four local prosecutors 
(and one city police department) to change how they charged peo-
ple in response to New York’s steady decline in crime. New 
York’s remarkable success was almost entirely a bottom-up, not 
top-down, enterprise. 
Another feature of New York’s success demands attention 
as well. Unlike California, New York reduced its prison popula-
tion gradually. The largest single-year decline, from 2000–2001, 
was 2,700 people, and the average annual decline was only 
1,305—the state simply maintained that decline for sixteen 
years, with modest declines every year except 2007. That stands 
in sharp contrast to California, in which Realignment led to a 
sharp one-year drop followed by . . . not much. This seems to be 
a pattern that emerges from top-down legislative fixes: there are 
big immediate declines followed by stability. New York, however, 
suggests that bottom-up shifts may lead to more fundamental 
transformation, if perhaps at a slower rate. 
The lesson from New York and elsewhere—that urban coun-
ties are decarcerating while rural counties incarcerate—thus il-
luminates the second limitation with Zimring’s approach, which 
is that not all hearts and minds are the same. As we will see, the 
progressive prosecutor movement is less about changing hearts 
and minds, and more about giving voice to more-urban, more-
minority voters: those who hearts and minds are not the same 
as more punitive, rural White voters, but whose say has been 
historically curtailed.  
Yet this is not at all how Zimring describes the progressive 
prosecutorial movement, however, and what he says is surpris-
ingly dismissive. He states:  
Changing hearts and minds of prosecutors one at a time is what can be 
called a “bottom up” reform strategy of reform [sic], a combination of 
legal ethics curriculum and a course in empirical criminology to create 
what would be from the reformers’ perspective, a better class of prose-
cutor in thousands of county criminal courts in the United States.51 
This description is both remarkably condescending and inaccu-
rate. Progressive prosecution efforts have focused far less on 
 
 50. John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Im-
portance, Limited Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 173, 217 (2014). There 
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of these reforms on prison populations appears to be slight. See id. 
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tweaking educational practices in law schools, and far more on 
investing millions of dollars and thousands of hours into finding 
progressive-leaning candidates and then hitting the ground to 
mobilize previously-disinclined voters in extensive get-out-the-
vote campaigns, as well as on educational campaigns aimed at 
voters to help them understand the oft-overlooked power prose-
cutors wield.52 
Tellingly, the biggest progressive prosecutor successes have 
been in urban counties, such as Larry Krasner in Philadelphia, 
PA, Rachael Rollins in Suffolk County, MA (Boston), Kim Foxx 
in Cook County, IL (Chicago), Chesa Boudin in San Francisco, 
CA, and Eric Gonzalez in Kings County, NY (Brooklyn), alt-
hough recently we have seen successes in more suburban coun-
ties as well, such as the wave of reform-leaning commonwealth 
attorneys elected in Virginia in November of 2019.53 This urban 
clustering should not surprise us, especially when we take into 
account the populations that these get-out-the-vote programs fo-
cused on.54 Both crime and punishment tend to be disproportion-
ately concentrated in larger counties, which means a greater 
fraction of their residents are keenly aware of the costs—both in 
terms of excessive punishment and inadequate responses to vio-
lence—that come with overly-harsh prosecutorial practices. 
There was little need to change hearts and minds here. If any-
thing, what the progressive prosecutor movement has done is 
mobilize those whose hearts and minds were already different to 
ensure that their political voice is heard. 
Contrast this with state legislatures, where non-urban 
voices are far louder. Cities may still have a large share of the 
legislative voice, but they will nonetheless be required to negoti-
ate with more-punitive suburban counties and distinctly more 
punitive rural ones. No such negotiation is required when elect-
ing the local prosecutors. And as we saw above, there are very 
good reasons for state legislatures to resist passing the laws that 
Zimring describes as being easy to adopt. 
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And while the push for progressive prosecution has not 
stretched that much into rural America (although there were 
some gains even there in November of 2019), shifts in urban 
counties can have outsized effects. In 2007, the last year for 
which the Bureau of Justice Statistics provided reliable data, the 
top 1% of counties in terms of population processed over 25% of 
felonies cases, and the top 10% processed almost 60%.55 Those 
numbers may have declined a bit since 2007, as urban counties 
have embraced reforms and smaller counties have not, but given 
how densely clustered the U.S. population is as a whole, the gen-
eral pattern surely still holds. 
CONCLUSION 
Zimring’s new book is right to highlight the importance to 
mass incarceration of rather mundane, technocratic, and bu-
reaucratic systems that are easily overlooked. The death penalty 
and fifty years for a minor drug conviction are fascinating cock-
tail-party conversation topics; moral hazard problems that arise 
from implicit intergovernmental transfers are… not. Yet it is of-
ten these far more invisible defects that play major roles, and 
Zimring does a service to shine light on one of the more signifi-
cant ones.  
Unfortunately, when he turns to how to correct the problem, 
he makes two important missteps. First, he substantially under-
states the complicated politics of the problem. The moral hazard 
problem has persisted for years not because legislators and pros-
ecutors and corrections officials were simply unaware of it, but 
because it was—and remains—politically beneficial to many of 
them. Getting them to undo it will not be easy. Second, by adopt-
ing a state-level perspective, he overlooks that significant varia-
tion across counties within a state, which leads him to overstate 
how hard bottom-up reforms are. 
A final observation demonstrates why these two important 
errors are so significant. Since California grudgingly adopted Re-
alignment under intense Federal scrutiny, no other state has en-
acted this “easy” top-down reform. Yet during the same time, 
many counties across the country have succeeded in pulling off 
the “hard” bottom-up reform of electing progressive prosecutors. 
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To be clear, I am not saying that the moral hazard problem 
is irrelevant, nor that the politics of fixing it are impossible so 
we shouldn’t even try. But it is critical to understand why adopt-
ing Realignment-like laws will be hard, in order to figure out how 
to approach the politics of such reforms. And it is important that 
we take a both-and, not either-or, perspective on top-down vs. 
bottom-up reforms. 
 
